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Abstract
Objectives To investigate the effect of withdrawing incentives on
recorded quality of care, in the context of the UK Quality and Outcomes
Framework pay for performance scheme.
Design Retrospective longitudinal study.
Setting Data for 644 general practices, from 2004/05 to 2011/12,
extracted from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink.
Participants All patients registered with any of the practices over the
study period—13 772 992 in total.
Intervention Removal of financial incentives for aspects of care for
patients with asthma, coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke, and
psychosis.
Main outcomemeasuresPerformance on eight clinical quality indicators
withdrawn from a national incentive scheme: influenza immunisation
(asthma) and lithium treatment monitoring (psychosis), removed in April
2006; blood pressure monitoring (coronary heart disease, diabetes,
stroke), cholesterol concentration monitoring (coronary heart disease,
diabetes), and blood glucose monitoring (diabetes), removed in April
2011. Multilevel mixed effects multiple linear regression models were
used to quantify the effect of incentive withdrawal.
Results Mean levels of performance were generally stable after the
removal of the incentives, in both the short and long term. For the two
indicators removed in April 2006, levels in 2011/12 were very close to
2005/06 levels, although a small but statistically significant drop was
estimated for influenza immunisation. For five of the six indicators
withdrawn from April 2011, no significant effect on performance was
seen following removal and differences between predicted and observed
scores were small. Performance on related outcome indicators retained
in the scheme (such as blood pressure control) was generally unaffected.
Conclusions Following the removal of incentives, levels of performance
across a range of clinical activities generally remained stable. This
indicates that health benefits from incentive schemes can potentially be
increased by periodically replacing existing indicators with new indicators
relating to alternative aspects of care. However, all aspects of care
investigated remained indirectly or partly incentivised in other indicators,
and further work is needed to assess the generalisability of the findings
when incentives are fully withdrawn.
Introduction
As part of wider efforts to improve the quality and efficiency
of healthcare, purchasers worldwide have experimented with
linking performance indicators to financial incentives,
reputational incentives, or both, within pay for performance and
public reporting schemes. As the clinical evidence base and
policy priorities change over time, indicator sets must be
periodically reviewed and individual indicators modified,
removed, or replaced. Within financial incentive schemes,
indicators may also be removed because achievement rates have
reached a ceiling, thereby allowing new indicators, for which
improvement is possible, to be introduced.1
Incentives are intended to improve performance by changing
physicians’ behaviour, but evenwhen this approach is successful
the change may be temporary. If the incentive is necessary to
maintain high performance levels, its withdrawal will result in
lower achievement rates and a loss of performance gains. This
may occur, for example, because better performance requires
additional staffing resource that depends on the incentive
payments or because physicians’ expectations of reward are
altered. Depending on the nature of the incentives and the extent
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of their negative effects on other motivations for providers,
particularly intrinsic motivations, achievement may even fall
below performance levels attained before incentivisation.2
Alternatively, if incentives increase the perceived priority of
the activities,3 support the establishment of quality improvement
infrastructures and practices, or habituate providers to perform
at a high level, then achievement rates might be maintained after
withdrawal of the incentive. Such normalisation would require
the relevant processes and behaviours to become so routinely
embedded and integrated into providers’ practice that the
incentives become superfluous.4
To date, few examples of indicators being withdrawn from
incentive schemes have been seen, so evidence on the effects
is limited. When incentives to screen patients for diabetic
retinopathy and cervical cancer were withdrawn from a Kaiser
Permanente scheme in California, achievement rates fell by
3.1% and 1.6% a year respectively.5 These losses exceeded the
gains made during the preceding incentivisation period.
In the United Kingdom, the Quality and Outcomes Framework
(QOF) incentive scheme provides family practices with financial
rewards linked to performance on a range of more than 100
quality of care indicators, mostly related to processes of care
for common chronic conditions.6 7 Practices can exclude
(“exception report”) patients deemed inappropriate from the
payment calculations for various reasons (for example,
intolerance to a specified treatment or informed dissent by the
patient).8 The overall annual cost of the QOF exceeds £1bn per
annum,9 and the scheme has increased the average annual
income of non-salaried general practitioners by £23 000 (€27
640; $37 580) (approximately 30% of the average
pre-incentivisation income of £75 000).7 Performance on quality
indicators is recorded on practices’ clinical computing systems
and is centrally monitored through the national Quality and
Management Analysis System database.
The QOF is reviewed annually in a process overseen by the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, which makes
recommendations for individual indicators to be modified or
removed. Final agreement on changes to indicators is reached
in negotiations between the Department of Health and the British
Medical Association. For the third year of the QOF (2006/07),
three clinical indicators were removed: one after the emergence
of new evidence on the efficacy of treatment (influenza
immunisation for patients with asthma)10 11 and two that partially
overlapped with other broader indicators (spirometry for new
cases of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and monitoring
of lithium concentrations for patients on lithium treatment). For
the eighth year (2011/12), a further eight indicators were
removed specifically because achievement rates were judged
to have reached a ceiling, even though the activities were still
deemed to represent best practice.1 The central Quality and
Management Analysis System database does not monitor
performance for removed indicators.
The aim of this study was to assess the effect that removing the
incentives for these indicators from the QOF scheme had on
subsequent performance, both on performance as measured by




Indicators removed from the QOF scheme are not routinely
measured and reported after removal. To investigate the effect
of the withdrawal of the incentive on practices’ performance,
we reconstructed the relevant indicators by using a large primary
care database, the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD).
This database holds complete electronic patients’ records
(including diagnoses, prescriptions, and referrals) from
participating general practices with the Vision clinical computer
system, used in approximately a fifth of all English practices.12
Patients’ data are recorded in the form of Read codes—a
hierarchical clinical coding system. In July 2012 data were
available for 644 practices and 13 772 992 patients. Figure 1⇓
shows details on complete patients’ records within and across
the study period.
Characteristics of final datasets
The study period extended from 1 April 2004, the date of
introduction of the incentivisation scheme, to 31 March 2012.
Practices’ performance under the QOF is measured over a
financial year, so we divided the study period into eight financial
years (1 April to 31 March the following year). Not all 644
practices provided research standard data (as assessed by the
CPRD assessment algorithm) for the whole period.Within each
year, we identified practices that reliably contributed data for
the whole year. Our main dataset comprised this group of
practices, which varies over time. We also generated two
alternative datasets with which to assess the sensitivity of our
findings. For the first, we included 452 practices that were
continuously active and up to standard for the whole of the study
period; for the second, we selected a subsample of 50 practices
that were most representative of UK practices in terms of list
sizes of patients and area deprivation according to the Index of
Multiple Deprivation,13 14 two of the most important predictors
of QOF performance.12 15 16 In each of the three datasets, for
each financial year, we defined “eligible” patients as those
registered with an included practice for the full year. Figure 1⇓
describes the process in detail, and table 1⇓ shows the available
characteristics of the practices (patients and practices are
anonymised in the CPRD).
Conditions
We chose seven chronic conditions for which quality indicators
had been included in, and subsequently removed from, the QOF
scheme—asthma, coronary heart disease, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, severe mental
health (psychotic illness), and stroke—and one for which a
quality indicator measuring a process similar to the process
incentivised in a removed indicator was
available—hypertension. To identify patients with each
condition in the CPRD, we used the QOF business rule code
sets (the algorithms used for the identification of patients in this
incentive scheme) in addition to relevant keywords identified
by clinicians to generate unrefined, inclusive lists of Read codes
and other clinical activity codes. This more inclusive approach
aimed to account for changes in the business rules over time
and the dynamic nature of code usage. Two clinicians
independently reviewed these lists and reached consensus on a
conservative list of codes (indicating the presence of the
respective condition with a high degree of certainty). For
diabetes, for example, Read code C107.12 (diabetes with
gangrene) was included and 13B1.00 (diabetic diet) was
excluded. Read codes used in the study are available from the
clinical codes repository.17 We treated all conditions, except
asthma, as chronic and unresolvable, so that we considered a
patient with a relevant code at any point during the study period
to have the condition from that time onwards. Patients with
asthma with a code denoting resolution of the condition were
excluded from the denominator (the set of patients designated
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to have the condition) from the date of the resolution code. To
comply with QOF definitions, we limited denominators for
diabetes and epilepsy to patients aged 17 or over and 18 or over
respectively.
Characteristics of removed indicators
In the first eight years of the incentivisation scheme, 11
indicators were removed (see table 2⇓ and appendix table A1).
Ten of these indicators had been introduced in year 1 of the
scheme (2004/05), and one (MH7) had been introduced in year
3 (2006/07). Ten of the removed indicators related to the
monitoring of particular aspects of patients’ care; one indicator
related to the treatment provided (influenza immunisation for
adult patients with asthma). Seven of the monitoring indicators
related to physiological or biochemical measurements (such as
a record of blood pressure), and for each of these we also
modelled the corresponding intermediate outcome indicator
from the QOF scheme (for example, blood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg).
We modelled the indicators in the CPRDmainly by using Read
codes, but we also included codes relating to drugs, tests, and
test results where appropriate. For example, we used codes for
administered influenza immunisation products in addition to
appropriate Read codes to model the influenza immunisation
indicators, and we used test values for the intermediate outcome
indicators. We also modelled several additional, unremoved,
indicators to use as covariates in the analyses, which are also
shown in table 2⇓ (see statistical modelling section).
Although some indicators have undergone small or moderate
changes since their introduction, we used a single static
definition to reconstruct each in the CPRD, to more reliably
model changes in performance over time (appendix table A1).
To construct each indicator, we defined relevant numerators
and denominators. For example, for indicator Asthma7
(percentage of patients aged 16 and over with asthma who had
influenza immunisation in preceding 1 September to 31March)
we defined the denominator as the number of patients with
asthma in the relevant financial year and the numerator as the
number of those patients who were immunised between 1
September and 31 March of the same financial year. For
intermediate outcome indicators, we limited the denominators
to patients for whom we were able to extract at least one
non-missing test value in the defined period (usually 15months)
and the numerator to the subgroup of patients whose last
recorded test value was within the range required by the
indicator.
We report on indicators that we successfully constructed, on
the criterion of exhibiting scores and trends comparable to those
reported under the QOF. Our a priori decision was to discard
indicators that could not be modelled reliably. However,
comparison of the scores on our constructed indicators with
those reported under the QOF (through the Quality and
Management Analysis System) could only be approximate.
Under the QOF, practices are allowed to “exception report”
(exclude) patients from care, and hence from calculation of
scores on the indicators, for a variety of clinical or logistical
reasons.8We included these patients in the modelled indicators,
to avoid potential bias should exception reporting rates
themselves change as a result of removal of indicators,18 focusing
on a population measure of quality that is free from potential
manipulation.
Statistical modelling
We did two sets of analyses, using multilevel multiple linear
regressions and a longitudinal interrupted time series design.
The first set of analyses examined whether the removal of an
indicator from the incentives framework affected the subsequent
mean performance of practices as measured by that indicator.
The second set of analyses investigated the effect of the removal
of each monitoring indicator on the corresponding intermediate
outcome indicator.
On examination, the levels and trends of the indicators related
to medication review in patients with epilepsy (EPI3/7),
follow-up of severe mental health disorders (MH7), and
spirometry in new chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
patients (COPD2) were assessed as unreliable and were not
included in the analysis. For example, rates of spirometry were
close to zero (compared with mean national reported rates under
the QOF of more than 90%, for more than 750 000 patients),
indicating that the relevant Read codes were systematically not
captured in the version of the CPRD that we used. The levels
and trends of the indicators accepted as reliable were comparable
to levels reported nationally under the QOF,19 although levels
were lower because of the inclusion of exception reported
patients.
For withdrawn indicators, to quantify the effect of removal by
2011/12, we used multilevel regression models to generate
practice level predictions based on the pre-intervention level
and trend of the withdrawn indicator in the previous three years
(two if removed in April 2006). To better account for the
variation in performance levels over time and the changes in
our sample, we controlled the predictions for performance on
identical process indicators in other disease groups (if available),
performance on similar process indicators within the same
disease group, and practices’ characteristics.We then subtracted
the post-removal model estimates from the observed scores and
used a meta-analysis method to combine them across practices
into an overall “removal” effect.20 Table 2⇓ describes the design
and the indicators used. For “linked” outcome indicators, the
approach was the same but we did not control for other outcome
indicators within the disease group because we did not identify
any that we considered similar.
Before implementation, we validated the method for short term
and long term effects of removal. For the short term predictions
(that is, 2011/12 when the indicator was removed in April 2011),
we assumed that indicators were removed in April 2010 and
used the method to predict 2010/11, hypothesising that the
overall effect would be very close to zero across all models. We
found that to be the case, and, although small changes in the
specification of the models did not affect the results greatly, the
inclusion of the control indicators improved overall performance.
For the long term predictions (that is, 2011/12 when the indicator
was removed in April 2006), we used indicators that were not
withdrawn before 2010/11 but assumed that they were
withdrawn in April 2006 to estimate the performance of the
models in 2010/11, again hypothesising that we would not
observe removal effects. However, we did observe moderate
effects in some models, and the obtained results were very
sensitive to small changes in the specifications. Therefore, we
decided not to use this predictions-observations comparison
method for the long term investigation; instead, we made a
simple comparison between performance levels in the last time
point pre-removal (2005/06) and the levels in 2011/12,
controlling for practices’ characteristics in a multilevel
regression analysis. The full details of the modelling are
provided in the web appendix.
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For all main analyses, we logit transformed indicator scores to
account for potential ceiling effects and the variation in effort
needed to increase performance at different levels; that is, we
assumed that, for example, more effort is required to affect an
improvement from 90% to 95% than for an improvement from
60% to 65%. This non-linear relation is modelled through the
transformed score.21 The analysis on the transformed scores also
ensures that predictions fall within the 0-100 range. In instances
where a practice score was at 100% or 0% (resulting in a
transformed score of +∞ or −∞ respectively), we applied the
empirical logit.22 For better interpretability, we present predicted
scores and differences (from observed) that are back transformed
to percentages. For indicators on which some practices scored
either 0% or 100%, the back transformed practice mean does
not correspond exactly to the mean calculated using
untransformed data. We used Stata v12.1 for all analyses.
We repeated all analyses on two subsamples of the main dataset
(fig 1⇓) and using untransformed indicator scores. We present
results for three of the five sensitivity analyses (sensitivity
dataset 1 and logit scores; sensitivity dataset 2 and logit scores;
main dataset and untransformed scores) in the appendix and
discuss differences in the results section.
Results
The practices included in the study were broadly representative
of English practices with respect to area deprivation but tended
to be much larger on average than practices nationally. In
addition, practices from the North East, Yorkshire and the
Humber, and East Midlands regions were under-represented in
the database (table 1⇓).
Disease prevalence rates calculated using the database were
broadly comparable to rates reported under the QOF (table 3⇓).
Recorded prevalence rates declined for asthma and coronary
heart disease and increased for chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease and diabetes over the study period. Recorded prevalence
rates for hypertension, epilepsy, psychosis, and stroke remained
relatively stable. Levels and trends were largely unchanged
when calculated on the two sensitivity samples (appendix table
A2)
Performance on indicators
Indicators removed in April 2006
For Asthma7 (patients with asthma receiving influenza
immunisation), mean performance remained relatively stable
across the incentivisation (2004/05 to 2005/06) and
post-incentivisation (2006/07 to 2011/12) periods, ranging from
78.0% to 79.0%. In comparison, mean performance on the four
influenza immunisation indicators that remained in the scheme
was higher throughout the entire study period, remaining stable
between 2004/05 and 2007/08, before deteriorating somewhat
in later years.
ForMH3 (patients on lithium treatment with a record of lithium
concentrations), mean performance improved from 91.1% in
2005/06 (the last year the indicator was included in the scheme)
to 92.5% in 2011/12. Performance on the corresponding
intermediate outcome indicator (MH5/18: patients on lithium
treatment with lithium concentrations in the therapeutic range)
was also quite stable from 2005/06 onwards.
Indicators removed in April 2011
For the blood pressure monitoring indicators removed in April
2011 (CHD5, DM11, and Stroke5), average performance
remained high after removal and very close to levels in previous
years (92-94%). Performance for the blood pressure monitoring
indicator that remained in the scheme (BP4: monitoring in
hypertensive patients) also remained stable at around 90%.
Performance on each of the corresponding intermediate outcome
indicators (control of blood pressure) improved throughout the
study period.
For the cholesterol monitoring indicators, a small decline in
mean performance was apparent for CHD7 (from 88.3% in
2010/11 down to 87.0% in 2011/12) but DM16 showed stability
(91.4% in 2010/11 and 91.2% in 2011/12). Performance for
Stroke7, the only cholesterol monitoring indicator that remained
in the scheme, also seemed stable, at 85.3% in 2010/11 and
85.5% in 2011/12. Performance for the cholesterol intermediate
outcome indicators CHD8 and Stroke8 seems to have dropped
very slightly in 2011/12 compared with the previous few years,
whereas for DM17 the decrease wasmore pronounced, although
mean performance had been slowly declining for several years.
Mean practice performance in monitoring HbA1cmeasurements
(DM5) remained stable at around 92% following the indicator’s
removal in 2011/12. Performance on the corresponding
intermediate outcome indicator (DM6/20/23/26) increased until
2010/11 (71.4%) then fell back to 70.4% in 2011/12.
Effect of indicator removal
Tables 4⇓ and 5⇓ show findings from the short term comparison
of observed performance after removal of an indicator with our
estimates of the performance expected had the indicator not
been removed. Results from the long term analyses are discussed
below and provided in appendix table A8. Indicator scores and
short term predictions are also plotted in figures 2⇓ and 3⇓. The
values presented in table 5⇓ are results from the analysis of logit
transformed indicator scores, back transformed into percentages.
As such, practice means in table 5⇓ do not always correspond
to the raw means given in table 4⇓.
Indicators removed in April 2006 and linked
indicators
For Asthma7, the adjusted (controlled for practices’
characteristics) back transformed mean difference between
2005/06 and 2011/12 levels was −0.70% (95% confidence
interval −1.01% to −0.39%), indicating a very small drop in
performance over time. The difference between 2005/06 and
2011/12 levels forMH3was not statistically significant (0.65%,
−0.11% to 1.46%). The linked intermediate outcome indicator
MH5/18 (lithium concentrations within the therapeutic range)
also showed no significant difference between 2005/06 and
2011/12 levels (0.63%, −0.38% to 1.72%), following removal
of MH3.
Indicators removed in April 2011 and linked
indicators
The indicators for monitoring blood pressure (CHD5, DM11,
and Stroke5), HbA1c (DM5), and cholesterol in patients with
diabetes (DM16) all showed no statistically significance
differences between observed and expected levels following
removal. However, the cholesterol monitoring indicator for
patients with coronary heart disease (CHD7) showed a
significantly lower observed mean in 2011/12 compared with
expectation (−1.19%, −1.56% to −0.81%).
For the linked indicators relating to blood pressure control,
observed performance for CHD6 in 2011/12 was very close to
expectation, and for DM12/30 and Stroke6 differences of around
0.3% were found, with only the last one reaching statistical
significance (−0.35%, −0.65% to −0.05%). The two cholesterol
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control indicators had observed mean scores in 2011/12 only
slightly, but significantly, below expectation (CHD8: −0.32%,
−0.62% to −0.02%; DM17: −0.45%, −0.75% to −0.15%), but
we found a larger difference for the HbA1c control indicator
DM6/20/23/26 (−2.08%, −2.45% to −1.71%).
Sensitivity analyses
For the two indicators removed in April 2006 (Asthma7 and
MH3), performance rates over time remained at least as high
as in the pre-removal years. We observed a similar pattern for
the indicators removed in April 2011. Levels of indicator scores
were almost identical in sensitivity analysis 1 (all contributing
practices across the whole time period) but slightly higher in
sensitivity analysis 2 (50 more representative practices in terms
of list size). Trends are given in appendix tables A3 and A4.
Results were broadly similar in all sensitivity analyses (appendix
tables A5-A8). Estimates from sensitivity analysis 1 (sensitivity
dataset 1 and logit scores) were similar to the ones obtained in
the main analysis, and no differences existed in the conclusions.
In sensitivity analysis 2 (sensitivity dataset 2 and logit scores),
we found fewer statistically significant differences (for example,
no differences for Asthma7, CHD7, CHD8, DM17, or Stroke6),
reflecting the much smaller sample of practices. In sensitivity
analysis 3 (main dataset but with untransformed scores), we
found no statistically significant difference for Stroke6 (although
the effect was of similar magnitude), but we observed
statistically significant differences for DM6 (in 2011/12) and
MH3.
Discussion
The recent proliferation of pay for performance schemes in
healthcare reflects a perception in some policy circles of
providers’ motivation as self interested, and physicians and
other professionals are increasingly induced with explicit
incentives linked to quality metrics.23 If physicians’ behaviour
is primarily self interested, financial and reputational incentives
should be effective in improving performance, but only while
the incentives are in place. Evidence from outside the health
field suggests that extrinsic motivators such as financial
incentives not only are transitory in their effects but can actually
be damaging in the longer term: they can diminish intrinsic
motivators, including professional andmoral motivations, which
may not recover once the extrinsic motivator is withdrawn.24 25
Financial incentives can therefore be both expensive and, in the
longer term, counterproductive.
For incentives in healthcare to buck this trend, the professional
and altruistic motivations of providers would need to be more
robust than those in other fields, or the incentives would have
to be so carefully aligned that intrinsic motivations are
reinforced (or at least, not damaged).3 Alternatively, changes
to infrastructure made by providers to attain quality targets—or
resulting from reinvestment of rewards—could lead to sustained
improvements in performance beyond the period of
incentivisation. In this study, we modelled the effect of
withdrawing a range of incentives on subsequent performance
under a comprehensive, national scheme for primary care
providers. For five of the six indicators withdrawn in 2011/12,
we found no significant effect on subsequent short term
performance. For one of the two indicators removed in April
2006, adjusted levels in 2011/12 were not significantly different
from 2005/06 levels. However, estimated differences were
relatively small across all indicators, including for the two
indicators that showed statistically significant deterioration.
Strengths and limitations of study
The main strength of the study was its the use of millions of
electronic medical records from hundreds of general practices
(using the same information clinicians used for providing care
for the patients, thereby minimising observer effects) to
construct relevant quality indicators and evaluate the effect of
withdrawal of incentives. However, some important limitations
exist. Firstly, the withdrawnmonitoring indicators we modelled
remained incentivised through their linked outcome indicators
that remained in the scheme, as “not measuring something in
the required time” is counted as “failed to achieve relevant
intermediate outcome target.” A strong indirect incentive for
taking these measures thus still exists. For this reason, greater
effects on performance may be apparent for withdrawn
measurement indicators without a linked incentivised outcome.
Secondly, indirect incentivisation of withdrawn indicators exists
for certain subpopulations of patients (for example, for 2011/12,
18.8% of asthma patients aged 16 or over had at least one of
the four comorbidities for which the influenza immunisation
incentive was not withdrawn). We decided not to exclude these
comorbid cases so that our modelled indicators would not differ
in their populations from those defined under the QOF. In
addition, UK practices are also incentivised through a different
scheme to immunise patients aged 65 or over against influenza,
further partially incentivising the asthma influenza indicator for
approximately 25.2% of our patients in 2011/12. These figures
for comorbidity and age broadly agree with what has been
reported elsewhere.26 However, for 2011/12, 67.3% of the
patients in the denominator of the indicator were not indirectly
affected by any form of comorbidity or age related incentive.
Thirdly, CPRD practices are broadly representative in terms of
local area deprivation, but they tend to be larger than the average
English practice and use a single clinical computing system
(Vision 3, used in 19% of the 8200 plus English practices).
Choice of clinical system is a predictor of QOF performance,12
so the generalisability of our findings might be limited. Fourthly,
although CPRD prevalence rates and trends generally agree
with nationally reported rates (table 3⇓), some small differences
exist that might indicate with election bias or a problem
representativeness.
Fifthly, indicators have characteristics (such as points
values/remuneration and payment thresholds) that might affect
performance. However, these have remained relatively stable
over time and their effects could not be accounted for in the
models owing to collinearity. Sixthly, we used an interrupted
time series design to quantify the removal effects. This method
is arguably the best possible approach in the absence of a control
group,27 but it is sensitive to assumptions and we decided not
to use it for the indicators removed in April 2006 as we would
have had to extrapolate many years into the future.
Seventhly, we did not model exceptions, and for some patients
the care represented by an indicator will be inappropriate.
Nevertheless, we argue that the potential for bias or manipulation
is greater if excepted patients are not included in the analyses.
Eighthly, we used fixed definitions of indicators, but within the
QOF scheme some indicators changed over time (for example,
the target for DM6 (HbA1c control) varied from 7.0% to 7.5%).
However, we prioritised consistency for the time series analysis.
Finally, we originally aimed to model the effects of both year
and each indicator as varying by practice (that is, random
effects), but these models were very complex and did not
converge in some cases. We therefore modelled only year as a
random effect.
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Findings
Performance seems to have deteriorated modestly for one of
the two indicators withdrawn in year 3 of the scheme (2006/07).
For Asthma7 (influenza immunisation, worth up to £1527 for
the average practice), immunisation rates seemed to be stable
post-incentivisation, although the model estimated a very small
drop between 2005/06 and 2011/12 levels. Asthma7 was
withdrawn in the light of new evidence on the appropriateness
of immunising patients with asthma,10 11 so any relative decline
in immunisation ratesmay be attributable to practices responding
to new evidence rather than—or in addition to—the withdrawal
of financial incentives. By 2011/12, six years after the
withdrawal of incentives, immunisation rates were 0.6% higher
than in 2005/06, the final year of incentivisation, although that
small increase might be attributable to the changing
characteristics of CPRD practices (the adjusted difference
showed a 0.7% drop which translates to approximately 2.6
patients per practice and 21 500 patients nationally). However,
the effect of incentive withdrawal was clearly minor at the level
of individual practices. This stability in immunisation rates is
somewhat unexpected, given the uncertainty about the efficacy
of immunisation in this group of patients. Our estimated rates
of achievement for all influenza immunisation indicators were
approximately 10 percentage points higher than what has been
reported under the QOF and elsewhere.28 This discrepancy can
be explained by ourmore inclusive definition of the intervention:
we used both Read codes and influenza immunisation products
to define immunisation, which we felt was more realistic in
capturing exposure and avoiding potential coding bias, whereas
only Read codes are used under the QOF. Nevertheless, we used
the stricter “Read code only” definition to assess the sensitivity
of our findings for influenza immunisation, and although levels
were lower they were again stable over time for all indicators.
However, we also observed numerous patients who were
excluded from these indicators but for whom care was met—a
finding that warrants further investigation.
In the first two years of the QOF, two indicators incentivised
the monitoring of lithium concentrations: MH3 (measurement
of lithium concentrations, worth up to £382 for the average
practice) andMH5 (lithium concentrations within the therapeutic
range, worth up to £636). In year 3 (2006/07), when indicator
MH3was withdrawn, the maximum remuneration forMH5was
reduced by 60% and the upper threshold (the level of
performance required to secure maximum remuneration) was
increased from 70% to 90%. Practices therefore had to work
harder for less reward: maximum remuneration fell from £1018
to £255 for the average practice, and these lower rewards were
attainable only if lithium concentrations were maintained within
the therapeutic range. We did not, however, observe any
deterioration in monitoring rates following withdrawal of the
incentive: after a steep increase between 2004/05 and 2005/06,
rates continued to increase more slowly between 2005/06 and
2011/12. It could be argued that rates would have increased
more quickly under incentives had the initial momentum been
sustained, but the observed trend for MH3 was consistent with
performance on other measurement indicators maintainedwithin
the QOF scheme. For the linked control indicator (MH5/18:
lithium concentrations within the therapeutic range),
performance continued to improve between 2005/06 and
2008/09 before falling off, but it remained above 2005/06 levels.
For all the indicators removed in April 2011, levels of
performance were high (over 85%) in the first year of the scheme
and remained high for the next six years, which ultimately led
to their withdrawal. These indicators were also linked to
intermediate outcomes indicators, so some financial incentive
was retained in the post-incentivisation period. For example,
after removal of the blood pressure monitoring indicator for
patients with diabetes (DM11), practices still needed to measure
blood pressure to achieve the target for blood pressure control
(DM12). For five of the six removed indicators we analysed,
we found no significant change in achievement rates following
removal of the direct incentives, and the high levels of
performance were maintained. In the case of CHD7 (cholesterol
monitoring in patients with coronary heart disease) measurement
rates fell to 1.2% below projected rates, equivalent to
approximately 2.6 missed patients in the average practice and
more than 21 500 patients nationally. Of the indicators
withdrawn from April 2011, CHD7 was subject to the joint
highest incentive (£890 for the average practice), had the lowest
baseline achievement rate (85.2% in 2004/05), and increased
the most under incentivisation (by 3.1% in the first seven years).
Practices seem to have had a greater response both to the
introduction and to the removal of incentives for this activity,
and this warrants further investigation.
Of the five intermediate outcome indicators that were linked
with activities withdrawn in 2011/12, four scored below
projections although levels of performance remained high: blood
pressure control for stroke (Stroke6), cholesterol control for
diabetes (DM17) and coronary heart disease (CHD8), and
glucose control for diabetes (DM6/20/23/26). However,
differences between observed and expected performance were
very small except for DM6/20/23/26, the indicator with the most
changes in definition over time—a fact that probably partly
explains the finding. The HbA1c threshold for DM6/20/23/26
changed from 7.4% for 2004/05-2005/06 to 7.5% for
2006/07-2008/09, to 7% for 2009/10-2010/11, and back to 7.5%
for 2011/12 (appendix table A1).
Implications and conclusions
The success of incentive schemes depends not only on their
effect on providers’ performance while incentives are active
but also on subsequent performance once incentives are
withdrawn. English practices achieved modest improvements
in performance across a wide range of clinical activities under
the substantial incentives in the Quality and Outcomes
Framework. Following the withdrawal of incentives for several
activities, levels of performance were generally maintained
(including influenza immunisation for asthma patients, for which
evidence of effectiveness was equivocal) but no further
improvements were made. Possible explanations for this
apparent stability are the “routinisation” of activities by staff
and the higher expectations of patients, influenced by previous
years’ experiences. However, observed performance fell short
of expectation in some cases, suggesting that withdrawing
incentives is not without risk.
These findings should be interpreted in the light of the cost to
payers of incentivising providers’ performance, especially in
the context of cost effectiveness and missed opportunities.29
Modest but significant gains in performance are achievable in
the first year or two for newly incentivised activities.7 21 30
Although all the indicators we investigated were still indirectly
or partially incentivised through other indicators that were not
removed from the scheme, our findings indicate that
withdrawing incentives for aspects of care for which
performance has reached high levels and reinvesting in
alternative aspects of care could provide an opportunity to drive
improvement in the latter without greatly damaging quality of
care in the former, thus maximising health benefits from
incentive schemes. However, generalising the findings to all
incentivised aspects of care would be premature, and careful
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consideration needs to be given to aspects of care for which
financial incentives are to be withdrawn.
This study is based on data from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink
obtained under licence from the UKMedicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency. However, the interpretation and conclusions
contained in this paper are those of the authors alone.
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What is already known on this topic
The Quality and Outcomes Framework is a very expensive pay for performance programme that has shaped UK primary care since
2004
Under the scheme, increases in performance and a closing of the inequality gap have been observed
Improvements could be attributed to increasing performance trends before incentivisation, and the scheme might have led to a small
neglect of non-incentivised aspects of care
The scheme is regularly reviewed, and indicators have been withdrawn from it, but the effect of this on levels of care is unknown
What this study adds
The removal of incentives—although only partially—seems to have had a very small effect on quality of care, even over the long term
As new incentives can lead to quick gains in quality of care, replacing existing indicators with little potential for further improvement
could provide an opportunity to maximise health benefits from incentive schemes
Tables
Table 1| Practices’ characteristics for main and sensitivity datasets
Sample of 50 practices
nationallyAll available and up to
standard practices









6597.4 (3391.5)9111.9 (4535.6)10157.8 (5579.8)9643.7 (5211.9)9152.7 (4702.2)Mean (SD) list size†
50452499565554No of practices
No (%) of practices by national
deprivation fifth:
10 (20)83 (18)87 (17)96 (17)92 (17)0 (most affluent)
10 (20)95 (21)105 (21)112 (20)109 (20)1
10 (20)98 (22)107 (21)122 (22)120 (22)2
10 (20)88 (19)103 (21)128 (23)124 (22)3
10 (20)88 (19)97 (19)107 (19)109 (20)4 (most deprived)
No (%) of practices by region‡:
0 (0)7 (2)8 (2)11 (2)10 (2)North East
10 (20)59 (13)60 (12)72 (13)73 (13)North West
0 (0)9 (2)9 (2)17 (3)24 (4)Yorkshire and the Humber
0 (0)5 (1)6 (1)15 (3)19 (3)East Midlands
2 (4)39 (9)41 (8)47 (8)47 (8)West Midlands
2 (4)27 (6)29 (6)39 (7)44 (8)East of England
2 (4)38 (8)44 (9)50 (9)47 (8)South West
3 (6)49 (11)53 (11)53 (9)50 (9)South Central
7 (14)55 (12)71 (14)71 (13)61 (11)London
7 (14)46 (10)51 (10)54 (10)51 (9)South East Coast
4 (8)19 (4)20 (4)21 (4)21 (4)Northern Ireland
6 (12)58 (13)61 (12)65 (12)63 (11)Scotland
7 (14)41 (9)46 (9)50 (9)44 (8)Wales
*Characteristics for representative three out of eight time points presented for main analysis.
†For 8486 English practices participating in Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in 2004/05 (99.9% of all), mean list size was 6226 (SD 3869). For 8128
practices in 2011/12, mean list size was 6836 (SD 4274). For sensitivity samples 1 and 2, mean list size is practice average over all time points.
‡As reported by QOF, regional breakdown of English practices for 2011/12 was: North East=404 (5.0%), North West=1254 (15.4%), Yorkshire and the Humber=785
(9.7%), East Midlands=621 (7.6%), West Midlands=958 (11.8%), East of England=787 (9.7%), South West=719 (8.8%), South Central=501 (6.2%), London=1472
(18.1%), South East Coast=622 (7.7%).
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—2004/05-2005/0612 (£1527)TreatmentPatients (aged 16 and







CHD62004/05-2010/117 (£890)MonitoringPatients with coronary
heart disease with a




DM12/302004/05-2010/113 (£382)MonitoringPatients with diabetes with




Stroke62004/05-2010/112 (£255)MonitoringPatients with transient
ischaemic attack or stroke





CHD82004/05-2010/117 (£890)MonitoringPatients with CHD with a




DM172004/05-2010/113 (£382)MonitoringPatients with diabetes with
a record of total
cholesterol
DM16
DM2, DM14/22—DM6/20/23/262004/5-2010/113 (£382)MonitoringPatients with diabetes with
a record of HbA1c or
equivalent
DM5Blood glucose
MH4/17—MH5/182004/05-2005/063 (£382)MonitoringPatients on lithium therapy





EPI2/6——2004/05-2010/114 (£509)MonitoringPatients (aged 18 and
over) on drug treatment






MH4/17——2006/07-2010/113 (£382)MonitoringPatients with psychosis
who do not attend for
annual review who are













CHD=coronary heart disease; COPD=chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
*Indicator must be achieved in previous 15 months, unless otherwise specified.
†Maximum points available for indicator in year before removal. Points are converted into payments at rate of £127.26 per point (in 2011/12), adjusted for practice
size and disease prevalence.
‡Some of removed monitoring or measurement indicators are “linked” to outcome indicators that remained in scheme; for example, blood pressure measurement
is “linked” to blood pressure control.
§Process indicators from different disease domain for which process/action is similar or identical in removed indicator, selected to act as within process controls
in analyses (for example, influenza immunisation in patients with asthma and patients with CHD).
¶Process indicators from same disease domain as removed indicator, selected to act as within condition controls in analyses (for example, influenza immunisation
for asthma patients and smoking cessation advice for smokers with asthma).
**As explained in methods section, covariate indicators were not included in long term effects analyses (influenza immunisation; lithium therapy), but they are
listed here for completeness.
††BP4 (blood pressure monitoring in hypertension patients) and Stroke7 (cholesterol monitoring in stroke patients) are linked with outcome indicators BP5 and
Stroke8 respectively. BP5 and Stroke8 have been modelled in Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD) for comparison with intermediate outcome indicators
that are linked with removed indicators and are used as controls in outcome analyses.
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‡‡Analyses for indicators covering medication review in epilepsy (EPI3/7), follow-up of severe mental health disorders (MH7), and spirometry (COPD2) could not
be done, as indicators were too complex to model in CPRD (MH7) or respective code lists failed to capture plausible trends and levels compared with those reported
under Quality and Outcomes Framework (EPI3/7, COPD2).
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Table 3| Mean (SD) practice prevalence scores for main analysis dataset, compared with national scores.
2011/122010/112009/102008/092007/082006/072005/062004/05Condition
All available and up to standard CPRD practices within each year—main analysis
4.82 (1.22)5.11 (1.25)5.35 (1.27)5.42 (1.26)5.43 (1.23)5.58 (1.22)5.67 (1.26)5.74 (1.28)Asthma
12.05 (3.09)12.21 (3.07)12.18 (3.05)12.22 (3.01)12.11 (3.00)12.00 (2.92)11.74 (2.79)11.38 (2.65)Hypertension
2.84 (1.03)2.97 (1.13)3.07 (1.17)3.19 (1.20)3.29 (1.26)3.40 (1.28)3.48 (1.33)3.59 (1.37)CHD
1.39 (0.73)1.38 (0.74)1.33 (0.70)1.31 (0.68)1.27 (0.67)1.22 (0.64)1.17 (0.62)1.11 (0.60)COPD
4.09 (1.14)3.97 (1.07)3.83 (1.02)3.71 (0.95)3.58 (0.92)3.45 (0.87)3.30 (0.81)3.13 (0.75)Diabetes*
0.54 (0.19)0.55 (0.19)0.55 (0.18)0.58 (0.19)0.58 (0.19)0.59 (0.19)0.59 (0.19)0.59 (0.19)Epilepsy†
0.10 (0.06)0.10 (0.06)0.10 (0.06)0.10 (0.06)0.11 (0.06)0.11 (0.06)0.12 (0.07)0.13 (0.07)Mental health‡
(lithium therapy
only)
1.63 (0.51)1.63 (0.50)1.62 (0.50)1.62 (0.49)1.63 (0.50)1.64 (0.50)1.64 (0.50)1.64 (0.50)Stroke
499534556565566569567554No of practices
All English practices, as reported by QOF
5.90 (1.63)5.89 (1.42)5.95 (2.29)5.82 (1.45)5.68 (1.39)5.69 (1.42)5.73 (1.50)5.67 (1.63)Asthma
13.75 (3.94)13.60 (3.84)13.52 (4.44)13.2 (3.70)12.84 (3.53)12.50 (3.51)11.93 (3.52)11.16 (3.64)Hypertension
3.38 (1.37)3.39 (1.38)3.45 (1.49)3.47 (1.42)3.49 (1.28)3.52 (1.31)3.55 (1.36)3.54 (1.42)CHD
1.74 (0.91)1.68 (0.92)1.63 (0.96)1.57 (0.87)1.51 (0.81)1.45 (0.80)1.39 (0.82)1.36 (0.86)COPD
6.00 (2.91)5.76 (2.67)5.53 (2.21)5.26 (1.74)4.96 (1.46)4.98 (5.59)3.64 (1.07)3.42 (1.04)Diabetes*
0.83 (2.23)0.82 (2.21)0.77 (0.38)0.76 (0.31)0.76 (0.28)1.07 (5.54)0.60 (0.23)0.58 (0.24)Epilepsy†
0.87 (0.62)0.84 (0.61)0.84 (0.80)0.79 (0.55)0.77 (0.50)0.74 (0.47)0.63 (0.64)0.57 (0.52)Mental health‡
1.70 (0.86)1.67 (0.87)1.65 (0.97)1.62 (0.91)1.58 (0.74)1.55 (0.75)1.50 (0.75)1.40 (0.78)Stroke
81238245830582298294837284068486No of practices
CHD=coronary heart disease; COPD=chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; CPRD=Clinical Practice Research Datalink; QOF=Quality and Outcomes Framework.
*For patients aged 17 or over (except for QOF prevalence scores in 2004/05 and 2005/06, when no age restriction was applied).
†For patients aged 18 or over (except for QOF prevalence scores in 2004/05 and 2005/06, when no age restriction was applied).
‡Mental health as reported in QOF relates to all diagnoses of psychosis, irrespective of treatment, whereas in our analyses we focused on patients treated with
lithium.
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Table 4| Observed mean (SD) practice indicator scores (percentage achievement rates) over time, by group
2011/122010/112009/102008/092007/082006/072005/062004/05DescriptionIndicator
Influenza immunisation
78.8 (6.5)†79.0 (6.6)†78.2 (6.6)†78.0 (6.9)†78.2 (6.9)†78.0 (6.9)†78.2 (6.8)78.0 (7.0)Patients with asthma
immunised against influenza
Asthma7*
89.5 (4.5)90.2 (4.5)90.4 (4.8)90.5 (4.8)90.7 (4.8)90.8 (4.7)90.7 (4.7)90.5 (4.8)Patients with CHD immunised
against influenza
CHD12
90.1 (4.6)91.2 (4.5)91.9 (4.4)92.1 (4.6)92.2 (4.7)92.3 (4.8)92.1 (5.3)92.1 (5.2)Patients with COPD
immunised against influenza
COPD8
87.2 (4.3)88.5 (4.3)89.1 (4.4)89.5 (4.4)89.8 (4.4)90.1 (4.3)90.2 (4.3)90.1 (4.8)Patients with diabetes
immunised against influenza
DM18




93.9 (3.9)†94.1 (3.9)93.8 (4.1)93.9 (4.2)94.2 (4.1)94.2 (4.1)94.0 (4.3)93.6 (5.0)Patients with CHD with record
of blood pressure
CHD5‡
94.3 (3.0)†94.3 (3.0)94.0 (3.3)94.1 (3.3)94.2 (3.0)94.4 (3.1)94.3 (3.6)94.0 (4.1)Patients with diabetes with
record of blood pressure
DM11‡
92.4 (4.5)†92.7 (4.4)92.5 (4.5)92.5 (4.4)92.7 (4.1)92.5 (4.3)92.0 (6.2)91.4 (5.3)Patients with stroke with record
of blood pressure
Stroke5‡
89.6 (3.4)89.7 (3.5)89.4 (3.6)89.5 (3.8)90.1 (3.6)90.4 (3.8)90.0 (5.6)88.5 (5.1)Patients with hypertension with
record of blood pressure
BP4
90.5 (4.5)90.0 (4.6)89.5 (5.0)89.1 (4.9)88.4 (5.2)87.8 (5.5)86.1 (5.7)84.6 (6.6)Patients with CHD, last blood
pressure ≤150/90 mm Hg
CHD6
78.2 (7.5)77.8 (7.9)76.5 (8.2)75.8 (8.3)75.0 (8.6)73.8 (8.6)70.4 (9.2)68.3 (9.9)Patients with diabetes, last
blood pressure ≤145/85 mm
Hg
DM12/30
89.0 (5.0)88.8 (5.1)88.1 (5.6)87.4 (5.7)86.7 (6.1)85.9 (6.0)83.7 (6.7)81.8 (7.3)Patients with stroke, last blood
pressure ≤150/90 mm Hg
Stroke6
84.6 (5.6)83.8 (5.9)82.9 (6.1)81.9 (6.2)81.1 (6.5)79.9 (6.8)77.7 (7.2)75.1 (8.4)Patients with hypertension, last




87.0 (6.6)†88.3 (5.9)88.1 (6.2)88.1 (6.3)88.4 (6.3)88.2 (6.6)87.2 (8.1)85.2 (9.4)Patients with CHD with record
of total cholesterol
CHD7‡
91.2 (3.8)†91.4 (3.6)91.1 (3.8)91.1 (4.1)91.1 (3.9)91.2 (4.1)90.8 (5.8)89.7 (6.1)Patients with CHD with record
of total cholesterol
DM16‡
85.5 (6.9)85.3 (7.1)85.0 (7.1)84.6 (6.8)84.7 (6.9)83.9 (7.6)81.8 (10.1)77.6 (11.0)Patients with CHD with record
of total cholesterol
Stroke7
84.4 (4.8)84.8 (4.7)84.7 (5.1)84.8 (5.1)85.1 (5.2)84.5 (5.7)82.2 (6.5)78.4 (8.1)Patients with CHD, last total
cholesterol ≤5 mmol/L
CHD8
83.6 (4.6)84.5 (4.4)84.9 (4.6)85.1 (4.8)85.6 (4.9)85.3 (5.3)83.1 (6.1)78.6 (8.2)Patients with diabetes, last
total cholesterol ≤5 mmol/L
DM17




92.2 (3.7)†92.1 (3.6)91.6 (3.8)91.3 (4.0)91.2 (3.9)91.3 (4.1)91.2 (5.6)90.5 (5.6)Patients with diabetes with
record of HbA1c
DM5‡




92.5 (12.4)†92.4 (11.1)†92.1 (11.4)†91.8 (12.8)†91.0 (12.9)†91.4 (12.0)†91.1 (14.0)89.2 (14.3)Patients on lithium therapy with
a record of lithium levels
MH3*
89.6 (18.0)90.5 (17.6)90.9 (16.9)91.5 (16.6)90.7 (17.1)89.0 (19.8)87.9 (20.4)86.7 (22.8)Patients on lithium therapy with
lithium levels in therapeutic
range
MH5/18
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Within condition control indicators





80.4 (15.1)80.4 (15.1)81.4 (14.2)79.6 (14.2)76.7 (15.3)74.5 (15.3)70.0 (17.1)61.1 (18.0)Patients with newly diagnosed
angina referred for specialist
assessment
CHD2/13
71.5 (13.1)72.1 (13.3)72.8 (13.5)73.4 (13.7)74.2 (13.8)74.8 (14.1)75.5 (14.3)76.4 (14.5)Patients with hypertension with
a record of smoking status
BP2
(Smoking1/3)
90.0 (4.4)89.6 (4.6)89.4 (4.8)89.7 (4.7)89.9 (4.5)90.2 (4.7)89.6 (5.4)88.4 (6.9)Patients with diabetes with a
record of body mass index
DM2
92.7 (5.2)92.5 (5.8)91.8 (6.1)91.9 (5.0)91.9 (4.1)92.0 (4.2)91.5 (5.9)90.2 (6.3)Patients with diabetes with a
record of serum creatinine
DM14/22
95.6 (8.9)94.6 (9.8)95.0 (8.9)94.1 (10.6)93.5 (10.2)92.6 (12.3)92.3 (12.2)87.9 (17.3)Patients on lithium therapy with




90.0 (8.2)89.7 (7.4)89.1 (7.6)89.8 (7.4)89.8 (7.6)89.4 (7.7)89.1 (8.6)87.6 (12.5)Patients on drug treatment for
epilepsy with a record of
seizure frequency
Epilepsy2/6
CHD=coronary heart disease; COPD=chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
*Removed from April 2006.
†Post-incentivisation rates.
‡Removed from April 2011.
§Required value for HbA1c regulation indicator changed over time: 7.4% in 2004/05 and 2005/06; 7.5% in 2006/07 to 2008/9; 7.0% in 2009/10 and 2010/11; 7.5%
in 2011/12 and 2012/13. For consistency, 7.5% was set as target for glycaemic regulation.
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Table 5| Short term effects—mean back transformed observed and predicted scores and their difference (95% CI)*
2011/12‡2010/11†2009/10†2008/09†MeasureIndicator
Removed indicators§
95.0 (95.0)95.1 (95.0)94.8 (94.9)95.0 (94.9)Observed (predicted)CHD5
−0.02 (−0.24 to 0.20)0.08 (−0.11 to 0.27)−0.15 (−0.33 to 0.04)0.08 (−0.12 to 0.28)Difference (95% CI)
95.0 (95.0)95.0 (95.0)94.8 (94.9)94.9 (94.8)Observed (predicted)DM11
0.04 (−0.10 to 0.18)0.04 (−0.08 to 0.17)−0.08 (−0.20 to 0.04)0.04 (−0.10 to 0.18)Difference (95% CI)
93.5 (93.7)93.7 (93.7)93.6 (93.6)93.6 (93.6)Observed (predicted)Stroke5
−0.18 (−0.43 to 0.07)0.01 (−0.20 to 0.22)−0.01 (−0.23 to 0.21)0.01 (−0.18 to 0.21)Difference (95% CI)
88.4 (89.6)89.5 (89.5)89.3 (89.3)89.3 (89.3)Observed (predicted)CHD7
−1.19 (−1.56 to −0.81)0.01 (−0.30 to 0.32)−0.003 (−0.33 to 0.33)0.01 (−0.30 to 0.32)Difference (95% CI)
92.0 (92.2)92.1 (92.1)91.8 (91.9)91.9 (91.8)Observed (predicted)DM16
−0.18 (−0.36 to 0.001)0.04 (−0.12 to 0.20)−0.07 (−0.22 to 0.08)0.04 (−0.14 to 0.21)Difference (95% CI)
93.0 (93.2)92.8 (92.8)92.4 (92.4)92.0 (92.0)Observed (predicted)DM5
−0.15 (−0.32 to 0.02)0.02 (−0.13 to 0.17)−0.04 (−0.19 to 0.11)0.02 (−0.14 to 0.19)Difference (95% CI)
Linked outcome indicators
91.4 (91.3)91.0 (91.0)90.6 (90.6)90.1 (90.1)Observed (predicted)CHD6
0.14 (−0.11 to 0.39)−0.02 (−0.23 to 0.20)0.03 (−0.19 to 0.25)−0.02 (−0.25 to 0.21)Difference (95% CI)
79.2 (79.5)78.9 (78.8)77.6 (77.8)76.8 (76.7)Observed (predicted)DM12/30
−0.28 (−0.72 to 0.17)0.12 (−0.27 to 0.52)−0.23 (−0.62 to 0.16)0.12 (−0.29 to 0.54)Difference (95% CI)
90.1 (90.4)89.9 (90.0)89.4 (89.3)88.6 (88.6)Observed (predicted)Stroke6
−0.35 (−0.65 to −0.05)−0.04 (−0.32 to 0.24)0.09 (−0.20 to 0.38)−0.04 (−0.34 to 0.26)Difference (95% CI)
85.0 (85.3)85.4 (85.4)85.4 (85.4)85.5 (85.5)Observed (predicted)CHD8
−0.32 (−0.62 to −0.02)0.03 (−0.23 to 0.29)−0.04 (−0.30 to 0.23)0.03 (−0.22 to 0.28)Difference (95% CI)
84.2 (84.6)85.0 (85.1)85.5 (85.4)85.8 (85.8)Observed (predicted)DM17
−0.45 (−0.75 to −0.15)−0.02 (−0.26 to 0.23)0.04 (−0.19 to 0.28)−0.03 (−0.28 to 0.22)Difference (95% CI)
71.0 (73.0)72.0 (72.1)71.3 (71.0)69.9 (70.0)Observed (predicted)DM6/20/23/26
−2.08 (−2.45 to −1.71)−0.12 (−0.39 to 0.15)0.24 (0.01 to 0.47)−0.13 (−0.54 to 0.29)Difference (95% CI)
*For indicators for which denominators are small and 100% scores are prevalent, discrepancies can exist between true and back transformed scores owing to
empirical logit (that is, score at 100% is back transformed to lower score).
†Pre-removal time points used in modelling; predictions for 2008/09-2010/11 indicate good fit of linear models used.
‡Post-removal time points.
§All indicators removed in April 2011.
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Figures
Fig 1 Flow chart of dataset creation and analyses. Only successfully modelled indicators are listed. Indicator details are
provided in tables 2 and 4 and in web appendix table A1
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Fig 2 Trends and predictions for removed and related unremoved indicators. For indicators removed in April 2011, predicted
scores were compared with back transformed observed scores (from logit). Although back transformed observed scores
agree with raw scores fully in most cases, that might not be true for indicators for which denominators are small and 100%
scores are prevalent. This can lead to discrepancies due to empirical logit (that is, score at 100% is back transformed to
lower score) and an “unfair” comparison between observed and predicted. Unremoved process related control indicators
were also plotted (using raw scores as no comparison with predictions exists). Condition related control indicators were
not plotted; vertical lines indicate timing of indicator removal
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Fig 3 Trends and predictions for “linked” unremoved outcome indicators and related indicators. For short term removal
effects on the linked outcome indicators, predicted scores were compared with back transformed observed scores (from
logit). Although back transformed observed scores agree with raw scores fully in most cases, that might not be true for
indicators for which denominators are small and 100% scores are prevalent. This can lead to discrepancies due to empirical
logit (that is, score at 100% is back transformed to lower score) and an “unfair” comparison between observed and predicted.
Unremoved process related control indicators were also plotted (using raw scores as no comparison with predictions exists).
Vertical lines indicate timing of “linked” process indicator removal
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